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This fascinating but startlingly incomplete book is based on the author’s PhD thesis at 
Oxford University. His focus is on the constitutional negotiations in Russia from 
1990, before the collapse of the former USSR, until the summer of 1993. The book is 
a work of high-level political theory, and I must confess that I am a lawyer, albeit a 
lawyer who spends a great deal of time in the company of political scientists. So I am 
not competent to comment critically on the technical aspects of this book. However, I 
am familiar with at least some of the literature to which the author refers, and the 
overall impression is one of confident application of up-to-date methods and tools to 
absorbingly interesting subject-matter.2  
I have my own reason for interest in this book. Having first visited Moscow in 1983, I 
was a frequent visitor to Moscow as an expert and consultant in the period covered by 
the book, including several weeks immediately before the 1991 putsch and the period 
prior to the final breakdown of constitutional negotiations, the tearing up of the 1978 
Constitution, and the shelling of the parliament in October 1993. On a number of 
occasions I visited the Constitutional Court and interviewed judges including Viktor 
                                                 
1 Bill Bowring is Professor of Law at Birkbeck College, University of London, and is a practising 
barrister. He founded and is Chair of the International Steering Committee of the European Human 
Rights Advocacy Centre (EHRAC), which, in partnership with the Russian NGO Memorial, is assisting 
with over 150 cases against Russia, Georgia and Latvia at the European Court of Human Rights. He 
regularly acts as expert for the Council of Europe, the European Union, OSCE and UN.  He has more 
than 90 publications on topics of international law, human rights, minority rights and Soviet and 
Russian law. He first visited the USSR in 1983, speaks Russian , and visits Russia and other FSU 
countries many times a year. He previously taught at University of East London, Essex University and 
London Metropolitan University. 
2 I am aware of the short review of this book written by my colleague Jane Henderson at (2011) v.89 
n.4 Slavonic and East European Review 785-787. She is also a lawyer. I deliberately did not read it 
before writing this review.  
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Luchin, and came to know justices such as Ernest Ametistov, Tamara Morshchakova 
and Nikolai Vitruk, as well as the human rights reformers Sergei Kovalyov, Sergei 
Sirotkin, Valentin Gefter,. Liudmila Alekseeva, and Lev Ponomarov. The relevance 
of the perspectives these contacts gave me will be apparent in what follows below. 
In his introduction, the author brings together four approaches to understanding the 
outcomes of negotiations. These are first, what he refers to as the dominant approach, 
which stresses that outcomes are shaped by the strategic choices of the actors 
concerned. The three others are summarised (p.4) as follows: “When faced with 
uncertainty, politicians may: (i) rely on culturally inherited orientation to guide their 
actions; (ii) make strategic moves to take account of uncertainty; or (iii) use ideas to 
reason about their best course of action.” Thus (p.15), in the author’s not very elegant 
words “This study of the outcomes of constitutional negotiations will assess to what 
extent the predetermined preferences of powerful politicians and the impact the 
processes of preferences aggregation and the opportunities that this process provides 
for strategic interaction, will shape outcomes.” 
While drawing on a wide range of relevant contemporary sources, the author adopts 
various kinds of formalism, including (p.64) “preference ordering over outcomes” to 
show how Yeltsin really made his decision in the Autumn of 1991 to pursue economic 
reform rather than a new constitution. I was less than convinced, but I am not a 
political scientist. But my own research project colleagues, in a research project on 
minorities in Russia organised by the European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI, 
Flensburg) and the European Academy (EURAC, Bolzano/Bozen) include another 
practitioner of this methodology, Paul Chaisty (rendered “Chasity” in the 
Acknowledgments – one of a few typographical errors, but the most prominent), and 
there is no denying the rigour and seriousness of such political science research.  
Of course, many observers including me saw Yeltsin as a politician who acted from 
instinct and gut feeling rather than any process of rational choice. 
The book has the following structure (page 17). Chapter 1 investigates the reasons for 
the start of constitutional negotiations in 1990, and the choice of institutional rules 
which might structure decision-making. Chapter 2 looks at the outcomes of 
negotiations during 1991. Chapter 3 examines President Yeltsin’s decision not to 
pursue a constitutional settlement after the August 1991 putsch, but rather to go for 
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“shock therapy” economic reform. Chapter 4 uses the theory developed in the 
previous chapter to examine constitutional bargaining in the Congress of Peoples 
Deputies in 1992-3. Chapter 5 asks why the interaction of President, Speaker and 
Congress led to the collapse of constitutional negotiations in the summer of 1993. 
However, there is one actor which is almost entirely missing from the book’s analysis, 
and that is the Constitutional Court and its Chairman (and still Chairman today) 
Valeriy Zorkin. There are no entries for the Court or for Zorkin in the rather short 
Index, although there are, as far as I could see, two references in the text. The Court is 
referred to in passing on page 36, with a mention of the fact that the Congress created 
a constitutional court. 
Significantly, on page 136, Yeltsin is quoted as saying in a speech of 11 December 
1992, at the height of the crisis:  
“Moreover, part of what the chairman of the Constitutional Court said in his 
speech coincides with my programme for getting out of the crisis and in this I 
support him.” 
 But the author gives no indication why Yelstin might have said that in December 
1992, or what significance the Court or its chairman (Zorkin) might have had for him 
or for the other actors. December 1992, a crucial period, is not analysed as such. 
Indeed, a significant complaint about the book as a whole is that dates are rarely 
given. One has to look at the notes, and many of those are not dated. Perhaps dates 
were lost in the overall abstraction of the thesis. So, for the assistance of my reader, 
here are the dates of the ten sessions of the Congress3: 
• First: 16 May 1990 – 22 June 1990 
• Second (extraordinary): 27 November 1990 – 15 December 1990 
• Third (extraordinary): 28 March 1991 – 5 April 1991 
• Fourth: 21 May 1991 – 25 May 1991 
• Fifth (extraordinary): 10 July 1991 – 17 July 1991; 28 October 1991 – 2 
November 1991 
• Sixth: 6 April 1992 – 21 April 1992 
• Seventh: 1 December 1992 – 14 December 1992 
• Eighth (extraordinary): 10 March 1993 – 13 March 1993 
• Ninth (extraordinary): 26 March 1993 – 29 March 1993 
• Tenth (emergency): 23 September 1993 – 4 October 1993 
                                                 
3 Set out at http://www.politika.su/gos/ndrs.html (accessed on 2 April 2012) 
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As far as the author is concerned, there are three actors: President Yeltsin, the 
Congress of Peoples Deputies and Supreme Soviet and their members, and the 
Speaker of the Supreme Soviet from 29 October 1991, the Chechen scholar and 
politician Ruslan Khasbulatov, born in 1942.   
The most prominent of the deputies for the author and in fact was the lawyer Oleg 
Rumyantsev4, who studied at Moscow State University, Budapest, the LSE and 
Toronto, became a prominent reformer, and was elected a deputy of the Congress of 
Peoples Deputies of the RSFSR on 31 March 1990 at the age of just 29. He first 
appears on page 29 of this book, though without any biographical or contextual 
information. It was Rumyantsev who in April 1990 promoted the idea of forming a 
Constitutional Commission to examine the 1978 Constitution of the RSFSR with a 
view to its reform, and work on a possible new constitution. The Constitutional 
Commission started work in June 1990. The author interviewed Rumyantsev on 2 
March 1999, presumably while researching his PhD.  
At that time, and until the collapse of the USSR at the end of 1991, there was no 
constitutional court, but a very important innovation, the Committee for 
Constitutional Supervision (nadzor), which began work in May 1990. It too is missing 
from this book. It rendered some very important decisions, which were in the main 
respected by the authorities.5 It ceased to exist along with the USSR in December 
1991. The author does not mention that on 15 December 1990 the 1978 Constitution 
of the RSFSR was amended inter alia so as to provide for the establishment of a 
Constitutional Court of the RSFSR, though the relevant law was not approved by the 
Fourth Congress.6 
On 29 May 1990 Boris Yeltsin, a Communist Party boss from the Urals, was elected 
chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and on 12 June 1991 he was elected President of the 
RSFSR by popular vote. He won 57% of the vote in a six-candidate contest. He was 
sworn in on 10 July 1991 in a grandiose ceremony in which Mikhail Gorbachev, the 
President of the USSR, but not elected by popular vote, was very much sidelined. 
                                                 
4 Rumyantsev, now in his early 50s, has his own web-pages and blog at http://www.rumiantsev.ru/, 
with a wealth of contemporaneous  materials from the period covered by the book under review, and is 
Managing Partner of his own Consulting Agency – see 
http://www.rumyantsevconsulting.ru/team/head/ (both accessed on 1 April 2012).  
5 For a discussion see Bill Bowring “Russia and Human Rights: Incompatible Opposites?” v.1, n. 2 
(2009) Göttingen Journal of International Law 257-278 
6  See the web-site of the Constitutional Court, at http://www.ksrf.ru/Info/History/Pages/default.aspx 
(accessed on 1 April 2012) 
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Along with millions of others, I witnessed this on TV in Moscow. Yeltsin secured his 
place in history when on 18 August 1991 he evaded the KGB officers sent to arrest 
him and defied the putsch, famously standing on a tank outside the White House. 
Chapter 2 of the book under review starts by asking why the Congress did not debate 
the work of Rumyantsev’s Commission until October 1991, despite having completed 
the drafting of a new constitution by October 1990. (page 36). Having put forward a 
number of hypotheses, the author asks (page 48) why Yeltsin did not pursue his goals 
of transfer of control of policy from the USSR to the RSFSR, with a presidency, in the 
form of a new constitution, when the draft produced by the Commission, which 
Yeltsin supported in September 1990, sought to establish all his goals. That is, the 
Second, Third and Fourth Congresses did not pursue discussion of a new constitution. 
The author’s technique is to summarise the information “viable” (I think the author 
means “available”) to Yeltsin about Deputies’ preferences. The author also, correctly, 
focus on the “parade of sovereignties” in 1990 to 1991.7 
Thus, the author’s conclusion is that (page 57)  
“It was Yeltsin’s concerns about the implications of the federal issue that kept 
him from proposing discussion of the new Constitution at the Second 
Congress, but because Boris Yeltsin knew he could do better than the status 
quo with regard to the presidency and Russia’s relations with the Soviet 
Union, he was prepared to put these issues on the agenda and shape 
constitutional outcomes in Russia.”  
It was not clear to me that Hypotheses 2a to 2f (pages 43-44) and their evaluation, and 
the discussion of uncertainty, were required in order to reach that conclusion. But then 
I am not a political scientist. 
Chapter 3 is headed “Yeltsin’s missed opportunity?” (page 58) and asks why Yeltsin 
and the Congress “launched a programme of radical economic reform and made 
limited alterations to the current Constitution.”  This choice of strategy was, in the 
author’s words, “puzzling in retrospect”, even a mistake. The author’s tactic is to 
model Yeltsin’s decision using “expected utility theory” (page 63). This is a 
“decision-theoretic analysis of the conditions that would motivate a rational power-
                                                 
7 See Bill Bowring  “The Russian Constitutional System: Complexity and Asymmetry” in Marc Weller 
and Katherine Nobbs (eds) Asymmetric Autonomy and the Settlement of Ethnic Conflicts (University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2010) 48-74; see the long list of regions declaring sovereignty at 55 
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seeking politician in Yeltsin’s position” which “identifies some conditions that must 
hold for this to have been a rationally intelligible decision.” The conclusion is that 
Yeltsin did not miscalculate. Whether he was rational is a moot point, at least in my 
view. And it is well-known that in the face of acute economic crisis in late 1991 he 
followed the advice of Yegor Gaidar and some Harvard experts, and pursued radical 
neo-liberal policies of rapid privatisation (known in Russia as prikhvatizatsiya), and 
the rapid and dubious creation of the “oligarchs” who have played such an important 
role in Russia to this day. 
Chapter 4 is where I find a great deal missing from the author’s account and analysis. 
Here he investigates the period from autumn 1991 to the last quorate meeting of the 
Congress from March 1993. On pages 87-89 the author presents a table showing 
“Changes to the current constitution from the Fifth to the Seventh Congresses”, 
showing that at the Sixth Congress, when the Federal Treaty became part of the 1978 
Constitution, two articles, 81 and 86, referred to powers of the Constitutional Court. 
But the text contains no explanation of what this Court was or how it had appeared. 
In fact, the constitutional amendment referred to above was approved by the Fifth 
Congress on 12 July 1991. On 29-30 October 1991, 13 out of 15 justices of the 
Constitutional Court were elected on the initiative of the Speaker, Ruslan 
Khasbulatov, including Valeriy Zorkin, who had for several years been a member of 
Rumyantsev’s Constitutional Commission. The American scholar Robert Sharlet 
wrote at the time:  
“[Zorkin’s] public career as an active reformer did not get underway until he 
became a senior consultant to the Russian Constitutional Commission in 1990. 
On the Commission, Zorkin strongly advocated a presidential republic within 
a separation of powers doctrine, a position he continues to hold, 
notwithstanding the widespread canard that he is trying to undermine the 
presidency on behalf of the parliament.”8 
On 30 October 1991 the first working meeting of the Court of the RSFSR took place, 
followed on 14 January 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, by its first 
                                                 
8 Robert Sharlet “Chief Justice as Judicial Politician” (1993) 2 East European Constitutional Review 
32-37, at 32-3 
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sitting as a Court.9 On 1 November 1991, Valeriy Zorkin was elected Chairman of the 
Constitutional Court by secret ballot of the justices, for an unlimited period.10 
That first session was highly significant, since the new Court heard a case on the 
constitutionality of President Yeltsin’s decree (ukaz) “On the formation of a Ministry 
of Security and Internal Affairs of the RSFSR”, seeking to merge the two institutions. 
The Court held that the decree was unconstitutional, and that the President had 
exceeded his competence, and that his decree would lead to real restrictions of the 
rights and freedoms of the citizen.11 Yeltsin obeyed. 
The Court then got utterly bogged down in the Case of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union for most of 1991, arriving on 30 November 1992 at a compromise 
judgment12 which was not, as had been hoped by many, a Russian Nuremburg, and 
which permitted the Communist Party of the Russian Federation to survive until the 
present day as the second force in Russian politics. The case has been well analysed 
by my colleague Jane Henderson.13 
It is at this point that the book under review has a rather large gap. For December 
1992 was the moment at which Valeriy Zorkin intervened prominently in the ongoing 
constitutional negotiations.  Robert Sharlet’s article was entitled “Chief Justice as 
Judicial Politician”14. He argued as follows:  
“Since December 1992, Russia's newest democratic institution, the 
Constitutional Court, and especially its Chief Justice, Valery Zorkin, have 
been at the center of the country's ongoing constitutional crisis.”15 
Sharlet relates how, with the Congress and President at daggers drawn,  Zorkin boldly 
took the initiative and summoned President Yeltsin and Speaker Khasbulatov to a 
meeting which he chaired. The two attended the meeting, a sign that Zorkin was not 
                                                 
9 http://www.ksrf.ru/Info/History/Pages/default.aspx (accessed on 1 April 2012) 
10  See Zorkin’s biography on the web-site of the Constitutional Court, at 
http://www.ksrf.ru/Info/Judges/Pages/judge.aspx?Param=2 (accessed on 1 April 2012) 
11 Decree (postanovleniye) of 14 January 1992, 10-P-U/1992, at 
http://www.ksrf.ru/Decision/Pages/default.aspx (accessed on 1 April 2012) 
12  Decree (postanovleniye) of 30 November 1992, 9-P/1992, at 
http://www.ksrf.ru/Decision/Pages/default.aspx (accessed on 1 April 2012) 
13 Jane Henderson “The Russian Constitutional Court and the Communist Party case: Watershed or 
whitewash?” (1997) v.40 n.1 Communist and Post-Communist Studies 10-16; Jane Henderson “Making 
a Drama out of a Crisis: The Russian Constitutional Court and the Case of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union” (2008) v.19 n.3 Kings Law Journal 489-506 
14 Robert Sharlet “Chief Justice as Judicial Politician” (1993) 2 East European Constitutional Review 
32-37  
15  Ibid p.32 
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to be ignored. Speaking on behalf of the Court, he advised them that if the meeting 
did not produce a resolution of the crisis, the Constitutional Court would begin 
proceedings against both for failure to fulfil their constitutional obligations. The Court 
at that time had the right to commence a variety of procedures on its own initiative. 
The parties agreed to hold a referendum on 11 April 1993, and this was approved by 
the Congress. The crisis having been averted, Zorkin was feted by both sides, was 
awarded a prestigious prize, and was declared "Man of the Year." 16 I recall a 
magazine cover from the time, with the headline “Zorkin the Peacemaker”, and his 
portrait with laurels.  
This is plainly what Yelstin was referring to in his speech cited by the author, noted 
above, but the author does not for some reason seem to pay it or its context any 
attention. 
At the December (Eighth) Congress, Zorkin created a Reconciliation Commission, 
and Yeltsin called upon him to broker a new deal. But Zorkin was unable to reconcile 
Yeltsin and Khasbulatov, and evidently began to have serious doubts about the 
wisdom of a referendum in Spring 1993. He withdrew as mediator.17 
However, the Court remained a key player, and after the close of the chaotic Ninth 
Congress, the President, the liberal and conservative factions in the Congress, and the 
press, all turned to the Court with fresh petitions, including one on the April 25 
referendum. On 21 April 2003, the Court adjudicated18 on one of these complaints, 
the Referendum Case, finding for Yeltsin against the Congress, declaring that only a 
majority of the turnout was necessary to win the first two questions, namely, 
confidence in the President and approval of his economic policy. On the third and 
fourth questions, which could have led to legally binding calls for early elections of 
the parliament and President, the Court found that the Law on Referenda required the 
approval of a majority of eligible voters.19 
                                                 
16 Ibid, p.35 
17 Ibid, p.36 
18 Decree (postanovleniye) of 21 April 2003, 80-P/1993 at 
http://www.ksrf.ru/Decision/Pages/default.aspx (accessed on 1 April 2012) 
19 Ibid, p.37 
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The American scholar Kim Lane Scheppele referred to Zorkin in a survey on 
“Guardians of the Constitution”, the Hungarian and Russian Constitutional Courts20  
as a “Russian Phoenix”21 
“By late Saturday, Zorkin had presided over a compromise acceptable to all. 
Yeltsin agreed to withdraw his proposed referendum and to stop insisting on 
Gaidar as the lone candidate for Prime Minister; the Congress of People's 
Deputies agreed not to hold its planned votes to strip the executive branch of 
power; and a referendum on a new Constitution would be held in April 1993. 
After the Congress of People's Deputies voted overwhelmingly in favor of this 
compromise, Khasbulatov and Yeltsin shook hands.' The role of Valerii 
Zorkin in brokering this deal was clear to all, as he was the one who read the 
final agreement to the Congress of People's Deputies, ending the dangerous 
standoff. "22 
On 18 December 2002 the New York Times editorial exclaimed how surprising it was 
that a "democratic temperament" had emerged in Russia.23 The editorial credited 
Valerii Zorkin with the transformation, calling him "Russia's answer to Chief Justice 
John Marshall." 
All of this is entirely absent from the book under review. 
Another US scholar, Herman Schwartz, wrote that  
“… the Court and its Chairman, Valery Zorkin, won great public approval. 
Activist beyond any other judge in recent history in any Western or East 
Central European country, he continually gave speeches and interviews, 
asserting the Court's responsibility to defend the constitution. In 1993, Zorkin 
became the chief mediator between the Russian parliament and President 
Yeltsin, straddling the line between legal and political judgments, and often 
                                                 
20 Kim Lane Scheppele “Guardians of the Constitution: Constitutional Court Presidents and the 
Struggle for the Rule of Law in Post-Soviet Europe” (2006) 154 University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review pp.1757-1851 
21 Ibid, p.1791 
22 Ibid, p.1807 
23 Editorial, A Russian Democrat, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1992, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/18/opinion/topics-of-the-times-a-russian-
democrat.html?scp=19&sq=zorkin&st=cse (accessed on 1 April 2012) 
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casting doubt on the independence and neutrality of the Court through his 
actions.”24 
Another optimistic voice was that of Mark Brzezinski25, who wrote  
“It is clear that President Yeltsin and the deputies of the Russian Congress will 
abide by the Court's decisions and that the justices who serve on the Court are 
able to act impartially and independently. The Court's success in controlling 
the other branches during this period of economic and political crisis-when 
political expediency could easily replace constitutionality in public policy-
making sets an important precedent for legality in the new Russian State.”26 
The Court under the leadership of Valeriy Zorkin continued to intervene during early 
1993. On 20 March 2003 President Yeltsin gave a television address (obrashcheniye) 
27 in which he explained his decision to order a referendum concerning the question of 
confidence in the President and Vice-President. The main reason for the political 
crisis in the country, he said, was not a conflict between the Congress and the 
President, but a conflict between the people and the Bolshevik system. The Congress, 
Yeltsin claimed, had manipulated the Constitution and blocked the referendum on 
land ownership and constitutional principles. Yeltsin argued that as the possibility of 
agreement with the conservative majority in Parliament had been exhausted, the 
President would assume direct responsibility for the fate of the country. It was his 
duty to guarantee the observation of fundamental constitutional principles such as 
popular government, federalism, separation of powers, human rights, and basic 
freedoms.”28 
Although this TV address was neither a Law nor a Decree, the Court under Zorkin’s 
leadership took rapid steps to consider its constitutionality, by way of one of the five 
non-judicial functions given it by the Law “On the Constitutional Court”, the 
Zaklyucheniye, or “Finding”.  Under that Law, suspended in October 1993 and 
subsequently replaced with an entirely new law, the Court had the right to issue a 
Finding under its own initiative. According to Herbert Hausmaninger, Zorkin 
                                                 
24 Herman Schwartz “The New Courts: An Overview”  2 East European Constitutional Review 28-32 
25 Mark Brzezinski “Toward "Constitutionalism" in Russia: The Russian Constitutional Court” (1993) 
v.42 n.3 International and Comparative Law Quarterly pp. 673-690 
26 Ibid, p.690 
27 Text at http://www.rau.su/observer/N09_93/9_01.HTM (accessed on 1 April 2012) 
28 Herbert Hausmaninger “Towards a "New" Russian Constitutional Court” (2005) 28 Cornell 
International Law Journal 349-386,  359-60 
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considered this television statement to amount to an attempted coup d'état. The Court, 
on its own initiative, subsequently endorsed by a request from the Supreme Soviet, 
examined the broadcast. President Yeltsin refused to attend this session or to submit 
documents requested by the Court, including the text of his decree.  
In its nine-to-three Finding of March 2329 (the reform-minded judges Ametistov, 
Morshchakova, and Vitruk dissented and judge Kononov was absent), the Court 
found seven violations of the Constitution and the Union Treaty in the President's 
address. The Court, however, remained silent on the question of impeachment.30 
According to one Russian account, Zorkin found out by early September 1993 how 
far he had fallen from presidential approval. His presidential security was withdrawn 
from the government dacha which had earlier been made available to him, on the 
grounds that its surroundings were in an unsanitary condition. The guards, 
entertaining themselves, shot Zorkin’s cat.31 
However, the most recent textbook prepared for Russian school-teachers presents a 
remarkably charitable view of Zorkin and his activities from December 1992: 
In December 1992 at the Seventh Congress the relations between the 
Executive and Legislature reached the limit. The deputies blamed Yeltsin for 
the fall in production and the impoverishment of the population. New 
amendments to the Constitution were adopted, according to which the 
president must be subordinated to parliament, and then Yeltsin came out 
against this and appealed through the Congress to the citizens of Russia: “It is 
impossible to work with such a congress… It is not even the road back, it is 
the road to nowhere. I see only one way out from the crisis of power, and that 
is a universal referendum.” The Congress refused to approve Yegor Gaidar as 
Premier. The conflict came to a head. The parties tried to come to a 
compromise. Through the mediation of the Chairman of the Constitutional 
Court, an agreement was signed on constitutional stabilisation, which enabled 
the conflict to be solved peacefully: the Supreme Soviet was able to reject the 
unhappy Gaidar, and the new premier was Viktor Chernomyrdin. The 
President and Supreme Soviet were obliged by 31 March 1993 to adopt either 
                                                 
29 Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 13, Item No. 466 (1993), at http://www.rau.su/observer/N09_93/9_02.HTM (accessed 
on 1 April 20120 
30 Hausmaninger, op cit n.24, 360 
31 At http://www.uroki90.ru/wiki.htm (accessed on 2 April 2012) 
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a joint version or two versions of a new Constitution and put them to a 
universal referendum. However, the next Supreme Soviet refused to fulfil its 
obligation.”32 
But for the author of the book under review, these events might never have occurred, 
and the key actor involved is apparently not worth the mention. 
It is probably not for me to suggest that the author’s methodology, sophisticated and 
rigorous though it is, has blinded him to such an important component of his subject-
matter. His conclusion is to be found in his final sentence at page 156. 
“The insights of this book suggest that, if we want to understand the 
conditions in which politicians choose institutions, we need not just to 
understand how institutions structure decision-making about constitutional 
rules, and what politicians want and value, but we also need to understand 
how dynamic elements of the political environment, that are subject to rapid 
change, such as information and ideas, shape politicians’ decisions as they 
struggle to create new political orders.” 
Again, the English is convoluted, but the meaning is clear.  
Finally, I was puzzled by the reference in the Acknowledgments to a Centre for 
Constitutional Research in Moscow. The author does thank Olga Sidorovich, the 
Director of the Institute for Law and Public Policy (ILPP33), which publishes the 
journal Comparative Constitutional Review and pursues constitutional research at a 
very high level. Perhaps he had ILPP in mind. Or perhaps there was such a Centre in 
the 1990s. Furthermore, on page18 there is reference to “the Central Communist 
Party” in 1990. This is a new one on me.  
Overall, my view is that this is a book to be consulted by all scholars researching the 
topic of the constitutional crisis of the early 1990s. The author has interviewed many 
of the leading actors, and consulted extensive archives. I have no reason to doubt that 
the book is a monument to political science methodology. But, as I said at the outset, 
there is a rather large gap. 
                                                 
32 A. Bezborodov, N. Yeliseeva, V. Shestakov Perestroika i krakh SSSR (Perestroika and the collapse 
of the USSR) 1985-1993, St Petersburg, NORMA, 200 
33 www.ilpp.ru (accessed on 2 April 2012) 
